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Nonrecognition of Post-Bankruptcy
Arbitration: Victrix Steamship Co. v.
Salen Dry Cargo A.B.
I. Facts
Victrix Steamship Company, a Panamanian corporation, and Salen Dry
Cargo A.B., a Swedish corporation, entered into an agreement in August
1984 that provided for Salen's charter of a ship from Victrix. Four months
later Salen declared bankruptcy in Sweden and informed Victrix that it
would not make further payments under the charter agreement.
Seeking to recover damages resulting from Salen's default, Victrix com-
menced arbitration proceedings in London as provided in the agreement
with Salen. Salen, however, refused to participate in the arbitration and
advised Victrix to file any claims with the bankruptcy estate in Sweden.
Victrix followed this advice and filed a claim with the bankruptcy estate,
but also pursued other avenues for recovery of its damages.
Victrix instituted an in personam admiralty action in the District Court
for the Southern District of New York' claiming breach of the charter
agreement by Salen. Victrix initiated the action by attaching Salen's New
York accounts. 2 Victrix also filed an action in the New York Supreme
Court, claiming breach of contract, and received an order of attachment
from the state court with respect to the same accounts already attached
in the federal admiralty action. 3
Subsequently, Victrix's arbitrator, acting alone 4 in London, awarded
$302,531.96 to Victrix. Shortly thereafter, the High Court, Queen's Bench
*J.D. Candidate, 1989. Articles Editor, THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER.
1. Victrix S.S. Co., v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 65 Bankr. 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
2. Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. possessed $234,291.49 of Salen's funds. Id. at 467.
3. Id.
4. Salen was notified of the arbitration hearing, but neither appointed an arbitrator nor
participated in the arbitration. Id.
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Division, entered judgment on the award. 5 Thus, Victrix possessed the
London arbitration award and the British judgment against Salen.
Meanwhile, in the United States, Salen successfully removed the state
action to federal court where it was consolidated with the federal admiralty
action.6 In the federal district court, Victrix moved to have the London
arbitration award confirmed and the British judgment enforced. Salen
sought to have the attachment vacated by arguing that the Swedish bank-
ruptcy proceeding, already underway, stayed other creditor actions. 7
The district court vacated the attachment, but did not rule on the en-
forceability of the London arbitration award and the British judgment,
preferring to defer such decision to the Swedish bankruptcy court. 8 Vic-
trix sought reversal of the district court's ruling in the Second Circuit.
Held, affirmed: Given the general principles of comity as well as specific
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, federal courts will recognize foreign
bankruptcy proceedings, provided foreign laws comport with due process
and fairly treat claims of local U.S. creditors, and disallow enforcement
of foreign arbitration awards and judgments obtained subsequent to such
bankruptcy proceedings. Victrix S.S. Co. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825
F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1987).
5. "[Tlhe High Court, Queen's Bench Division, entered judgment on the award under
Section 26 of the British Arbitration Act, 1950." Victrix S.S. Co. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B.,
825 F.2d 709, 711 (2d Cir. 1987).
6. The case was removed pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 205 (1982), which provides:
Where the subject matter of an action or proceeding pending in a State court relates to an arbitration
agreement or award falling under the Convention, the defendant or the defendants may. at any time
before the trial thereof, remove such action or proceeding to the district court of the United States for
the district and division embracing the place where the action or proceeding is pending. The procedure
for removal of causes otherwise provided by law shall apply except that the ground for removal provided
in this section need not appear on the face of the complaint but may be shown in the petition for removal.
For the purposes of Chapter I of this title any action or proceeding removed under this section shall be
deemed to have been brought in the district court to which it is removed.
Victrix, 825 F.2d at 711 n.1.
7. The parties agreed to adjourn their motions pending the Second Circuit's decision in
Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Serv. AB, 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985), a case concerning
the same Swedish bankruptcy proceeding and related issues. Victrix. 825 F.2d at 712.
8. The district court based its holding on the Second Circuit's decision in Cunard. In
Cunard the Second Circuit held that the trial court had been correct in granting comity to
the Swedish bankruptcy and, therefore, correct in staying the creditor actions. The court
vacated an attachment of Salen's assets in the United States, thus refusing to grant comity
to the London arbitration proceeding, which was provided for in the parties' contract. See
infra text accompanying notes 59-60.
The Cunard case was very similar to the Victrix case except for the fact that in Victrix
an English judgment had been entered against Salen, while in Ctinard the action was to
compel arbitration. Victrix S.S. Co. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 65 Bankr. 466, 468 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
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II. Legal Background
In coming to its conclusion in Victrix, the Second Circuit relied on the
doctrine of international comity, as well as Section 304 of the United
States Bankruptcy Code, the Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and the court's prior reasoning in
Cunard Steamship Co. v. Salen Reefer Services B.A. 9 The following dis-
cussion looks at each of these principles individually to provide a back-
ground for the Second Circuit's decision in Victrix.
A. INTERNATIONAL COMITY
The doctrine of comity governs the recognition of foreign judgments in
the federal courts.' 0 Comity is the recognition that one nation extends
within its own territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of
another. I I It is not a rule of law, but one of practice, convenience, and
expediency. 12 Comity is a nation's expression of understanding that dem-
onstrates due regard for international cooperation and to the rights of
individuals protected by its own laws. 13 Comity should be withheld only
when its acceptance would be contrary or prejudicial to the interest of
the nation called upon to give it effect. 14
The U.S. Supreme Court established the standard governing determi-
nation of the extent and scope of comity in the 1895 opinion of Hilton v.
Guyot.' 5 When an action is brought in a court of this country by a citizen
of a foreign country against an American citizen, and the foreign judgment
has been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, the foreign judg-
ment should be upheld and enforced, unless the defendant shows some
special ground for impeaching the judgment. 16 Grounds for impeachment
include showing that the judgment was affected by fraud or prejudice, or
that under the supplemental principles of international law the judgment
should not be given full credit and effect. 17
9. 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985).
10. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895): Ritchie v. McMullen. 159 U.S. 235
(1895) (comity required that a Canadian judgment be treated as conclusive when sued on
in a federal court).
II. Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
12. 453 F.2d at 440.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
16. Id. at 205.
17. Id.
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In determining whether "a court of competent jurisdiction" rendered
the foreign judgment, several things must be considered, all of which flow
from the constitutional concept of due process.' 8 Due process requires
that for comity to be extended, the foreign court must abide by funda-
mental standards of procedural fairness.19 Thus, the foreign court must
have valid jurisdiction over the cause and parties, there must be due
allegations, proof and the opportunity to defend, the court's proceedings
must follow the course of a civilized jurisprudence, and, finally, such
proceedings and results must be stated in a clear and formal record. 20 If
these criteria are met, comity should be extended to recognize the foreign
judgment.
B. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
It has long been established that foreign trustees in bankruptcy are
allowed, as a matter of comity, to assert the rights of a foreign bankrupt
in American courts. 2' The extension of comity to foreign bankruptcy
proceedings, by staying or enjoining the commencement or continuation
of an action in the United States against a debtor or its property, enables
the assets of a debtor to be dispersed in an equitable, orderly, and sys-
tematic manner.22
Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197823 deals with the
complex and important problems surrounding the legal effect U.S. courts
will give to foreign bankruptcy proceedings. 24 In order to administer assets
18. The Second Circuit, in Canard, illustrated that the concept of due process is not
solely an American doctrine by reference to a case from early 19th century England:
In Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East 192, 103 Eng. Rep. 546 (K.B. 1808). a seminal case in private international
law, the plaintiff attempted to enforce in England a foreign judgment which was obtained after process
was effected by having the summons nailed to the courthouse door on the I sland ofTobago. The defendant
had no notice of the summons and. indeed, had never set foot on the Island of Tobago. Refusing to
enforce the judgment, Lord Ellenborough illustrated the practical limits of the comity doctrine with the
following oft-quoted queries: "Can the Island of Tobago pass a law to bind the rights of the whole world?
Would the world sumbit to such an assumed jurisdiction?" Id. at 194, 103 Eng. Rep. at 547.
Canard, 773 F.2d at 457.
19. In accordance with the language of Hilton v. Guyot, the essential elements of a
judgment creditor's case for recognition under the common law should be: (1) a final judg-
ment; (2) subject matter jurisdiction; (3) jurisdiction over the parties or the res; (4) timely
and proper notice of the proceedings; (5) an opportunity to present a defense to an unbiased
tribunal; and (6) regular proceedings conducted according to a system of civilized jurispru-
dence. American courts generally scrutinize the last four elements under the due process
clause. Bishop, Obtaining Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign-Country Judgments in
Texas, 45 TEX. B.J. 287, 290 (1982).
20. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
21. Cunard, 773 F.2d at 458.
22. Id.
23. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-700 (1982).
24. Canard, 773 F.2d at 454; see, e.g., Honsberger, Conflict of Laws and tile Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 631 (1980); Keech, Problems in the Liquidation
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in the United States and to prevent dismemberment by local creditors of
assets located here, the representative of a foreign bankrupt may com-
mence a section 304 proceeding, rather than a full bankruptcy case in the
United States. 25 Section 304 governs the situation in which foreign bank-
ruptcy proceedings have been instituted, and creditors are attempting to
seize a debtor's assets located in the United States by commencing sep-
arate proceedings unconnected to the foreign country bankruptcy.26 Sec-
tion 304 provides that American courts may enjoin actions, enjoin the
enforcement of judgments against the debtor or property of the debtor,
or order other appropriate relief. 27
The guidelines provided, however, are not intended to be rigid rules. 28
They are meant to give a court maximum flexibility in addressing each
particular case. 29 Principles of international comity require that the court
be permitted to consider all the circumstances of each case in handing
down the appropriate orders. 30 In fact, Congress subsequently amended
section 304(c) before passage to expressly direct U.S. courts to consider
comity when evaluating a petition under section 304. 3 1 The drafters of
section 304 did not intend to overrule established principles of interna-
tional comity in foreign bankruptcy cases. 32 Rather, section 304 evinces
an express attempt to combine provisions of the Bankruptcy Code with
generally accepted principles of comity. 33
and Reorganization of International Steamship Companies in Bankruptcy, 59 TUL. L. REV.
1239 (1985).
25. Cunard, 773 F.2d at 454-55; see S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5821; H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 324-25, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6281.
26. Cunard, 773 F.2d at 455.
27. I1 U.S.C. § 304(b) (1982).
28. See sources cited supra note 25.
29. Id.
30. The text of § 304(c) specifically sets out principles to be considered by the court in
fashioning decisions in this area:
(c) In determining whether to grant relief under subsection (b) of this section, the court shall be guided
by what will best assure an economical and expeditious administration of such estate, consistent with-
it) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interest in such estate:
(21 protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and inconvenience in the pro-
cessing of claims in such foreign proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent disposition of property of such estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by
this title;
(5) comity; and
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the individual that such foreign
proceeding concerns.
II U.S.C. § 304(c)(1982) (emphasis added).
31. Canard, 773 F.2d at 456; see, e.g., supra note 30; Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d
624, 629 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Colorado Corp., 531 F.2d 463, 468 (10th Cir. 1976).
32. Cunard, 773 F.2d at 456.
33. Id.
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C. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS
1. Historical Treatment of Arbitral
Agreements in the United States
Traditionally, English courts held that irrevocable arbitration agree-
ments divested the courts of jurisdiction and thus they refused to enforce
such agreements. 34 American courts adopted this view as part of the
common law until the adoption of the U.S. Arbitration Act in 1924. 35 The
Arbitration Act, reversing centuries of judicial hostility toward arbitration
agreements, allows parties to avoid the costliness and delays of litigation
and place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other con-
tracts. 36 Accordingly, the Act provides that an arbitration agreement shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, absent grounds existing at law or
in equity for the revocation of the contract. 37
2. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards38
On June 10, 1958, a special conference of the United Nations Economic
and Social Council adopted the Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Convention). 39 The Convention
provides that each contracting state shall recognize a written agreement
in which the parties agree to submit to arbitration any or all differences
arising between them with regard to a defined legal relationship. 40
In 1970, the United States consented to the treaty, and Congress im-
plemented the Convention by passing chapter 2 of the U.S. Arbitration
Act. 4 1 The Convention was enacted pursuant to the treaty power provided
in the Constitution; therefore, 42 the Convention is the supreme law of the
land and any laws inconsistent with it must be set aside.4 3 Section 201
34. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 US. 506, 510 n.4 (1974).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 510-11.
37. Id.
38. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1982).
39. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520 n.15.
40. 9 U.S.C.A. § 201 annot., art. 1I (West Supp. 1987).
41. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 420 n.15.
42. "The Convention was negotiated pursuant to the Constitution's Treaty power. Con-
gress then adopted enabling legislation to make the Convention the highest law of the land.
As such, the Convention must be enforced according to its terms over all prior inconsistent
rules of law." Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat'l Oil Co., 767 F.2d 1140,
1145 (5th Cir. 1985).
43. The Fifth Circuit unequivocally stated in Sedco that:
This Convention is the supreme law ofrthe land. By its ratification in 1970, the United States obligated
itself to enforce arbitration agreements between foreign and domestic contracting parties. Any law or
decision prior in time to this express undertaking must be construed as consistent with the Convention
or set aside by it.
Sedco, 767 F.2d at 1148 (emphasis added).
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provides unequivocally that the Convention shall be enforced in U.S.
courts in accordance with chapter 2.44
The principal reasons the United States adopted and implemented the
Convention reflect two main goals of the Convention: first, the Convention
seeks to encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial ar-
bitration agreements in international contracts; second, the Convention
attempts to harmonize the standards by which agreements to arbitrate
are recognized and by which arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory
countries. 45 The Convention does not require automatic recognition of
arbitration agreements in the member countries. Article V of the Con-
vention, however, provides the only grounds on which the recognition
and enforcement of arbitral awards may be refused. 46 Thus, the over-
whelming intent of the Convention is to promote the inclusion of arbitral
provisions in international contracts through the assurance of their eq-
uitable enforcement in the signatory countries. 47
The Second Circuit's decision in Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co. 48 pro-
vides an example of the narrow application of the article V exceptions.
In that case a creditor, Copal, made a claim in Fotochrome's U.S. bank-
ruptcy proceeding based upon an arbitration award and judgment it had
obtained in Japan. 49 The arbitration had begun prior to Fotochrome's
filing of bankruptcy. Copal obtained the award and judgment, however,
after the filing and before the discharge in bankruptcy. 50 Thus, Fotochrorne
differs factually from the present case in two respects. First, unlike Victrix
in the present case, 5' Copal did not seek confirmation of the Japanese
judgment in either a state or a federal court. Rather, Copal filed a proof
of claim in the U.S. bankruptcy proceeding based upon the arbitral award.
Second, in Fotochrome Copal commenced arbitration prior to the debtor's
filing of bankruptcy. Conversely,- in Victrix the arbitration did not com-
mence until after the debtor's filing.
Regardless of the factual differences, however, Fotochrome is instruc-
tive in its application of the public policy exception to enforcement of
arbitration awards under the Convention. 52 The Second Circuit noted that
44. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1982).
45. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520 n.15.
46. Grounds for nonrecognition include: incapacity; lack of proper notice; fraud: lack of
final award; and public policy. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 201 annot., art. V (West Supp. 1987).
47. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520 n.15 (case cited).
48. 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975).
49. Id. at 515.
50. Id. at 514-15.
51. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
52. The "public policy" exception to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is em-
bodied in article V, § 2(b), of the Convention. It provides that "[recognition and enforcement
of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where
recognition and enforcement is sought finds that ...enforcement of the award would be
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the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award under the
Convention may be refused when the court in which enforcement is sought
finds that such recognition or enforcement would be contrary to its coun-
try's public policy. 53 The Second Circuit then approached the question
of whether bankruptcy provided the type of public policy exception al-
lowed by the Convention. 54 The court found that neither the Convention
nor the arbitration statutes indicated what should be done in the event of
bankruptcy of a party to an arbitration. 55 No reference discussed whether
the "public policy" requiring equal treatment of creditors in bankruptcy
is the kind of "public policy" that allows nonrecognition of foreign arbitral
awards. 56 Thus, the court expressly stated that it did not rule on whether
bankruptcy was or was not a "public policy" exception within article
V. 57 The court concluded, however, that the Convention permitted attack
on foreign awards only on grounds expressed in the Convention. In ad-
dition, the court held that article V exceptions must be construed narrowly
and applied only when enforcement would violate the forum state's most
basic notions of morality and justice. 58 Nevertheless, because the court
decided that Copal must first obtain a judgment on the award in a U.S.
court before making a proof of claim in bankruptcy, 59 the court concluded
the enforceability of the award need not be determined. 60
contrary to the public policy of that country." 9 U.S.C. § 201 annot., art. V, § 2(b) (West
Supp. 1987).
53. Fotochrome, 517 F.2d at 516.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 517.
56. Id. at 516.
57. The court stated: "[T]his appeal can be decided without the necessity of determining
whether the Bankruptcy Act involves a 'public policy' which is contrary to enforcement of
arbitral awards under the Convention." Id.
58. This view of the Convention and the "public policy" exception has subsequently
been reiterated by the Second Circuit in Waterside Ocean Navigation Co. v. International
Navigation Ltd., 737 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1984). There the court stated:
[The public policyl defense must be construed in light of the overriding purpose of the Convention,
which is "to encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in in-
ternational contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and
arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries ... . Thus, this court has unequivocally stated
that the public policy defense should be construed narrowly. It should apply only where enforcement
would violate our "most basic notions of morality and justice."
Id. at 152 (citations omitted).
59. The court determined that the Japanese arbitral award and judgment did not establish
a "judgment" under § 63a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C. § 103a(5) (1982). Thus, the
court directed Copal to seek a judgment based upon the award in the American courts
before it would be allowed to file a proof of claim in the American bankruptcy action.
Fotochrome, 517 F.2d at 519.
60. Since Fotochrome would be allowed to assert its defenses under article V of the
Convention, in Copal's subsequent action to obtain a judgment in the American courts, the
Second Circuit reasoned that the question of enforceability of the award was not before the
court. Fotochrome, 517 F.2d at 519.
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Two points relevant to the Second Circuit's decision in Victrix may be
deduced from Fotochrome. First, enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
falling under the Convention may only be challenged on the narrow grounds
for nonrecognition provided by article V. Second, the issue of whether
bankruptcy proceedings, filed by the losing arbitral party, fall under the
article V "public policy" exception to award recognition, remained an
open question in the Second Circuit.
D. CUNARD STEAMSHIP CO. V.
SALEN REEFER SERVICES AB 6 1
In Cunard the Second Circuit dealt with litigation, similar to that in the
present case, arising out of the same Swedish bankruptcy. Cunard com-
menced its action against Salen in the District Court for the Southern
District of New York by obtaining an order of attachment against assets
of Salen held by the United Brands Company. Cunard obtained the at-
tachment under the Arbitration Act in an attempt to force the arbitration
in London of an alleged debt between itself and Salen. 62 Subsequently,
Salen brought a motion to have the attachment vacated due to the stay
on creditors' actions imposed by the Swedish bankruptcy court.63 The
district court granted the motion. 64
The Second Circuit sustained the district court's ruling, holding that
the grant of comity to the Swedish bankruptcy court was proper; there-
fore, the attachment of Salen's assets in the United States must necessarily
be vacated. 65 The court based its reasoning on the doctrine of international
comity.66 Noting that the extension of comity to a foreign court requires
that such court recognize fundamental standards of procedural fairness, 67
the Second Circuit reasoned that this requirement had been satisfied by
proof of the similarities between Swedish bankruptcy law and the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code. 68 Thus, the court held that the laws and public policy
61. 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985).
62. "Cunard based its claim on a contract of charter between Cunard and Salen. The
contract provides for the arbitration in London of any dispute arising under the contract."
Id.
63. Salen had filed for bankruptcy in Sweden about a month prior to the commencement
of Cunard's action to compel arbitration.
64. Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs., 49 Bankr. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
65. Cunard, 773 F.2d at 461.
66. See supra notes 10-20 and accompanying text.
67. Cunard, 773 F.2d at 457.
68. In finding the bankruptcy laws of the two countries similar, the Second Circuit stated:
The principles of Swedish bankruptcy law are not dissimilar to those of our Bankruptcy Code. Swedish
law requires that upon declaration of bankruptcy, an interim trustee or administrator be appointed and
notice sent to all creditors. A meeting of creditors is scheduled and legal actions by creditors are stayed.
In addition, the court has the power to issue orders preventing the debtor from dissipating or absconding
with assets.
Id. (citing European Insolvency Guide, Sweden § 3.1).
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of the United States would in no way be violated by an extension of
comity to the Swedish bankruptcy. 69 In fact, the Second Circuit reasoned
that the United States' interest in the fair and efficient distribution of
assets in bankruptcy would be substantially furthered by deference to the
Swedish proceeding, which sought to achieve the same result. 70
In addressing the enforcement of the contractual arbitration provision,
the Second Circuit noted that strong public policy existed to support the
enforcement of such provisions, 7' but under the circumstances the inter-
ests preserved in the Swedish bankruptcy court outweighed such policy. 72
Pointing out that Cunard had sought to compel the arbitration after the
institution of the Swedish bankruptcy, the court characterized the action
as an attempt to maintain a "captive fund" to secure any arbitral award
it might receive. 73 The court refused to assist Cunard in this attempt,
stating that no compelling reason existed to allow a general creditor, whose
claim was subject to arbitration, to gain preference over other creditors. 74
Thus, the court stated that "[t]he road to equity is not a race course for
the swiftest" 75 and, consequently, held that the district court did not err
in vacating the attachment and that arbitration would not be compelled. 76
III. The Court's Analysis-Victrix Steamship
Co. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B.
In Victrix the Second Circuit had to determine which of two strong
policies relating to international comity should outweigh the other: (1) the
policy supporting the recognition of foreign arbitration awards and judg-
ments, 77 or (2) the policy extending comity to foreign bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. 78 In analyzing this problem, the court stated that under the
principle of comity and the provisions of section 304 of the Bankruptcy
Code, federal courts will recognize foreign bankruptcy proceedings pro-
vided the foreign laws comport with due process and fairly treat claims
69. Id.
70. The U.S. public policy of facilitating the orderly and systematic distribution of a
bankrupt's assets would best be served by deferring to the comparable bankruptcy laws of
Sweden. Id.
71. See supra note 58; Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516-20 (1974).
72. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
73. Cunard, 773 F.2d at 459.
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting Israel-British Bank v. FDIC, 536 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 978 (1976)).
76. Id.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 38-60.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 21-33.
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of local U.S. creditors. 79 Therefore, the court had to look at the Swedish
bankruptcy laws and ensure that they met such criteria.80 The court noted
that it had scrutinized the Swedish bankruptcy law in Cunard and found
it to be sufficiently similar to the federal Bankruptcy Code to warrant an
extension of comity. 8 1
Having established the validity of the Swedish bankruptcy proceeding,
the court then had to determine the effect of the London arbitral award
and judgment on such proceeding. 82 The court reasoned that despite the
normal deference accorded a foreign arbitral award and judgment, such
award and judgment could not be viewed in isolation from the particular
facts of the case. 83 In light of Salen's bankruptcy, the enforcement of the
arbitral award and judgment would conflict with the strong public policy
of ensuring equitable and orderly distribution of local assets of a foreign
bankrupt.8 4 Therefore, the London arbitral award and judgment would
not be enforced by attachment of assets in the United States8 5 when those
assets were already involved in a recognized foreign bankruptcy
proceeding86
In further support of its decision, the court noted that Victrix's rights
under the Convention would not be impaired as a result of its decision.8 7
Sweden is a signatory to the Convention, and the Swedish court could
be expected to accord Victrix whatever rights to which it is entitled under
the Convention.88 Victrix would enjoy the same protections and rights as
Salen's other creditors, since Victrix had already asserted its claim in the
Swedish bankruptcy proceeding.8 9 Thus, the court extended comity to
79. Victrix, 825 F.2d at 714. Note that the court also analyzed the case under New York
state law. The New York law in this situation, however, also relied on the doctrine of comity,
and thus led the court to the same conclusion as that reached under the application of the
federal law. Therefore, the court did not feel compelled to answer the choice of law question,
since the results were the same. Id. at 713.
80. The defendant, Salen, filed for bankruptcy in Sweden.
81. See supra text accompanying note 66.
82. Victrix had obtained an arbitration award and judgment in England subsequent to
Salen's filing of bankruptcy. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
83. Victrix, 825 F.2d at 714.
84. Id.
85. The Second Circuit applied reasoning similar to that applied in Cunard. See supra
notes 69-73 and accompanying text. The court stated:
Any distribution of Salen's limited assets is likely to affect other creditors, not parties to the proceeding.
who obeyed the Swedish court's stay and sought relief only in the bankruptcy proceeding. By attaching
Salen's local assets after its declaration of bankruptcy, Victrix attempted to secure a -captive fund- to
satisfy the anticipated arbitration award. We will not aid Victrix's efforts to evade the writ of the Swedish
bankruptcy court.
Victrix, 825 F.2d at 714 (citation omitted).
86. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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the Swedish bankruptcy and deferred decision on the effect of the arbi-
tration award and judgment to the Swedish court. 90
IV. Practical Implications
The Second Circuit expressly stated that the Convention governed the
claim for enforcement of the arbitration award. 9 1 It failed, however, to
follow this premise in its analysis of the case. 9 2 The court held that Cunard
required comity to be extended to the Swedish bankruptcy proceeding. 9 3
Thus, the court concluded, neither the arbitral award nor the judgment
could be enforced because such enforcement would violate public policy
promoting the equitable and orderly distribution of local assets of a foreign
bankrupt. 94
The court's opinion stated the Convention governed the case, 95 but the
court failed to articulate how it maneuvered around the mandatory require-
ment of foreign arbitral award enforcement established by the Convention.
Sedco Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican National Oil Co. 96 established
that the Convention is the supreme law of the land. 97 Fotochrome, an opin-
ion by this same court, established that one could challenge the enforcement
of foreign awards only on grounds set forth in the Convention, particularly
article V.98 In this opinion, however, the Second Circuit concluded only that
comity extended to the Swedish bankruptcy, and the foreign award could
not be enforced because such action would violate public policy.99 The court
never stated how these circumstances resulted in the refusal to enforce the
arbitral award as provided by the Convention. 0 0
Thus, in the future the practitioner is left to speculate on the analysis
supporting the court's decision.l10 One must conclude that the circum-
90. Id. at 716.
91. The Second Circuit stated:
With respect to the claim for enforcement of the arbitration award. it is clear that federal law applies.
The Convention is a treaty of the United States governing the enforcement of foreign arbitration awards.
It sets forth a procedure for enforcement of foreign arbitration awards to which all signatories are
expected to abide. The obligations of the United States under the Convention would be undermined if
they were not determined according to a uniform body of federal law.... ITlhe Convention ... leaves
the entire subjeit of enJfi-ineiit offireign arbitration aiwards governed by its terns.
Victrix, 825 F.2d at 712-13 (emphasis added).
92. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 91.
96. 767 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1985).
97. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
100. The Second Circuit, in Victrix, did not attempt to justify its refusal to recognize the
foreign arbitral award on grounds provided in the Convention.
101. This is a particularly difficult situation where a foreign practitioner, unfamiliar with
the American common law system, is attempting to understand how the Convention is
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stances of this case, as viewed by the Second Circuit, fall under one of
the exceptions to enforcement of arbitral awards provided by the Con-
vention. This assumption is necessary because, to assume otherwise,
would force one to conclude that the United States has violated its Treaty
obligations with approximately sixty-five nations. 102
In surveying the available exceptions under the Convention, it becomes
apparent that the one most resembling the present set of facts is the
"public policy" exception found in article V.10 3 This exception allows a
court to refuse enforcement of an award when such enforcement would
be contrary to the public policy of its country.'0 4 The Second Circuit
based its conclusion on the assertion that enforcement of the arbitration
award and judgment would "conflict with the public policy of ensuring
equitable and orderly distribution of local assets of a foreign bankrupt." 105
Given this statement, it is clear that if the court sought to justify its action
under the Convention, its reasoning would have fallen within the "public
policy" exception of article V. Thus, the Second Circuit has arguably
held by implication that the "public policy" defense in article V may be
applied in the event of bankruptcy of one of the arbitral parties.
The above analysis raises a question as to the scope of the new public
policy exception created by the court. Given the lack of explanation by
the court on this point, one could argue for a broad exception that would
allow nonenforcement whenever one of the parties to the arbitration filed
for bankruptcy, regardless of time or circumstance. Two factors, however,
suggest a much narrower view. First, Fotochrome stood for the propo-
sition that the public policy limitation on the Convention is to be construed
narrowly and applied only where enforcement would violate the forum
state's most basic notions of morality and justice. 106 Second, the circum-
stances of this action, when taken together, support the result; therefore,
the new exception to the Convention arguably should be closely limited
to the facts of this case.
applied in the United States courts. A plausible reading of Victrix, looking only at the court's
use of the statutory law, allows the conclusion that the court has completely disregarded
the operation of the Convention.
102. In prior decisions, the courts established that the Convention is the supreme law of
the land, see, e.g., supra note 43, and any refusal to enforce foreign arbitral awards must
be supported by the narrow exceptions found in the Convention itself. Thus, if one does
not assume that the court in Virtrix was applying an exception provided by the Convention,
the only alternative is that the court did not allow the Convention to govern the enforcement
of the award. If that is the case, the court has violated the mandatory character of the
Convention and also related treaties, for a violation of the Convention is a violation of the
treaties.
103. See supra note 52.
104. Id.
105. Victrix, 825 F.2d at 714.
106. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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The relevant circumstances in Victrix include the following: the arbi-
tration was commenced subsequent to the filing for bankruptcy; Victrix
was not a U.S. corporation; Sweden's bankruptcy law is similar to that
of the United States; and Sweden, a member of the Convention and also
host to the bankruptcy, could be expected to uphold Victrix's rights under
the Convention. 107 Arguably, if any of these circumstances are not pres-
ent, a court may come to a different conclusion in future litigation. This
question remains to be answered by future decisions on the issue.
V. Conclusion
The result reached by the Second Circuit is just and reasonable. The
courts, in the interest of respecting all creditors' rights, will not condone
a race to the assets of the foreign bankrupt. Accordingly, the Second
Circuit has created an article V "public policy" exception in the case of
bankruptcy by one of the arbitral parties. The extent to which the decision
provides precedent for a bankrupt seeking to prevent enforcement of a
foreign arbitral award, however, remains to be determined. Nevertheless,
the strong policy supporting the recognition and enforcement of arbitra-
tion awards obtained under the Convention suggests that the holding will
be closely limited to the facts of this particular case.
107. All the facts support the court's conclusion. Victrix, 825 F.2d at 709.
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